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… the virus, the disease, some would say the epidemic, of short-termism … 
threatens Australia’s long term future.  
Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, 2 October 2008 
 
 
The global financial crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of our economy to systemic risks. 
While its causes are numerous and relate to complex problems deeply embedded in capital 
markets, “short-termism” (excessive focus on short-term outcomes at the expense of long-
term wealth creation and sustainability) has frequently been flagged as a major contributor to 
this crisis. Although short-termism is not new, the global financial crisis has highlighted the 
presence of short-termism among institutional investors, and the failure of global markets and 
regulators to deal with such perverse and destructive behaviour (Guyatt, 2009).  Solutions are 
clearly needed. Although there is a body of research which provides evidence of the presence 
of short-termism in capital markets and the consequences of short-term decision-making on 
the financial well-being of both individuals and organisations, there is no consensus on 
mitigating solutions to short-termism. What emerges from the literature is the need to take a 
broad interdisciplinary perspective in seeking solutions to the problem.  
Consistent with this perspective, the four papers in this forum build on and extend prior 
literature in accounting and related disciplines, explore diverse but related areas of short-
termism, and make suggestions about how it might be addressed.  
In the first paper, Kym Irving shows that short-termism is a complex and multidimensional 
construct.  Irving’s wide-ranging review of research on short-termism is unique in that it 
brings together behavioural economics, psychology and cognitive sciences to provide 
powerful insights to the phenomenon from these diverse disciplinary perspectives, and 
highlights the importance of a multidisciplinary approach in seeking solutions to undesirable 
consequences of short-termism.  
Irving first takes us through biological and psychological underpinnings of short-termist 
behaviour and how ‘hot’ thinking about the qualities of immediate smaller rewards, rather 
than ‘cool’ thinking about delayed larger rewards explains what appear to be irrational short-
term choices. From psychology research on inter-temporal choice, Irving identifies 
tendencies for individuals to discount future rewards that are brought forward less than if the 
rewards are delayed into the future, and demonstrates how understanding cognitive processes 
provides better understanding of such phenomena than loss aversion explanations provided 
by behavioural economics (e,g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Drawing on her 
comprehensive literature review, Irving calls for decision environments that encompass 
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deliberative processes and address the behavioural issues underlying observed short-termism 
in capital markets; thus avoiding or diluting the perverse reward systems that are currently 
ingrained in organisations.  
The second paper by Michael Drew focuses on short-termism from an institutional investor 
(or a “universal owner”)1
Based on the findings of Hawley and Williams (2000b), Monks (2001) and Guyatt (2008), 
and argues that “universal owners” (such as pension/superannuation funds) through their 
investment policies or “mandates” are a key source of myopic short-term behaviour now 
observed in major corporations. The universal owner perspective has arisen with the growth 
of the “financial intermediated society” (Hawley and Williams, 2000; Bogle, 2005)
 perspective. Drawing on the findings of Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2005) and Mergenthaler, Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2008), he views short-termism 
and associated myopic corporate behaviour as a puzzle, and seeks to answer “why corporate 
managers and investors persist in exhibiting behaviours that trade off long-term value 
creation for meeting short-term financial targets”.  In answering this question, like Irving, he 
draws on intertemporal choice theory and shows that myopic behaviour is a rational response 
to short-term corporate incentives.  
2
While universal owners should typically take a long-term perspective consistent with the 
long-term objectives of their ultimate investors or beneficiaries, governance complexities 
have lead to a culture of short-termism. 
. In this 
new society, corporate ownership by institutional investors has intensified and has led to a 
concentration of ownership in the hands of a relatively small number of very large 
institutions.    
3
In the third paper, Gavin Nicholson and Zoie Cook also consider the growth and expanding 
influence of institutional investors and their contributions to short-termism in capital markets.  
In contrast to Drew, Nicholson and Cook focus on how the rise in institutional ownership 
(“institutional capitalism”) has contributed to short-termism in corporate board decision-
making.  They argue that the emergence of institutional investors as major company owners 
has led to a separation of ownership interests between the beneficial owners (retail investors) 
and the legal owners (institutional investors), which has “profound implications for the 
ownership and control of corporations”.  
  Universal owners typically reward investment 
managers on short-term performance metrics. This short-term orientation cascades down to 
investors and corporate managers. Drew hypothesises that universal owners are therefore the 
major source of myopic short-term behaviour evident in capital markets today.  Inspired by 
the findings of Hewitt, Bacon and Woodrow (2004), Drew then proposes a range of policy 
options that universal owners should adopt and apply in formulating mandates. These policies 
focus on universal owners developing long-term oriented organisational and incentive 
structures.   
Along similar lines to Drew, Nicholson and Cook argue that the ownership shift has been 
accompanied by a lengthening of the investment chain, leading to boards being exposed to 
greater pressure to deliver short-term results. The beneficial owners have also become more 
fragmented and removed from corporate decision-making due to the complexity and opaque 
ownership structures that have emerged with the rise of institutional capitalism.  As a result, 
the beneficial owners have, in practice, ceded the rights that accrue to traditional shareholders 
to the institutional owners. In this environment, the divergent aims of institutional investors 
are not given the same level of scrutiny as those of corporate managers, resulting in agency 
costs and behaviour which diverges from the long-term interests of the beneficial owners. 
Given this situation, Nicholson and Cook argue that the board of directors is the obvious 
mechanism to protect the interests of the company as a whole.  
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Using a multidisciplinary theoretical approach based on legal, agency theories and political 
analysis they propose a model of director motivation and ownership interests that aims to 
explain the differences in short and long-term orientations exhibited across corporations. 
Director motivation is assumed to be a function of “monitoring” (the cost and ability to 
observe director behaviour) and “slack” (the shielding of director actions from monitoring). 
Slack arises in corporations where director actions are not transparent to outsiders including 
institutional investors. In the presence of institutional investors and in the absence of slack, 
directors will be captured into acting in the institutional investors interests, leading to short-
termism. In contrast, the presence of slack allows directors to either pursue their own interests 
or those of the company as a whole (the long-term interests of the firm). Nicholson and Cook 
conclude by developing a set of propositions that link the level of institutional ownership and 
director behaviour to short or long-term outcomes. In addition to providing new insights into 
the director decision making, an intriguing contribution of the model is that greater 
transparency is not expected to reduce corporate short-termism in the presence of high 
institutional ownership of the company.  
The fourth paper by John Nesbitt provides a funds management industry perspective on 
short-termism. Nesbitt highlights that the repeated financial crises experienced over more 
than a century have short-termist behaviour as a common underlying factor, characterised by 
speculation and excessive risk-taking. He notes that successive economic booms have been 
accompanied by inflated asset prices and sharply rising credit, leading to spectacular crashes, 
with the various market participants seemingly surprised by the resultant economic recessions 
(depressions).  
Nesbitt suggests a number of causes for the observed short-termism in today’s capital 
markets. The misalignment of incentive-based compensation in companies, and the speed and 
quantity of information available about listed companies have both contributed to the short-
term focus on corporate performance. Similar misalignments of incentives and rewards have 
been prevalent among financial advisors and in financial institutions. Like other contributors 
to this forum, Nesbitt also notes that a cause of short-termism in capital markets can be 
attributable to the investment horizon mismatch evident in the investment management 
industry. While the industry espouses the principles of long-term investing, investment 
managers are increasing being judged on short-term outcomes.   
Nesbitt suggests that to overcome the historical ‘rhyming’ of financial crises, organisations 
need to develop operating frameworks that appropriately balance a tighter focus on and 
control of short-term factors (e.g. costs) while executing strategies for delivering long-term 
wealth creation and wealth preservation.  As part of this “balanced” framework, he argues for 
increased scrutiny and regulation of excessive gearing levels. He also argues for increased 
corporate transparency.  However, he does not advocate more frequent reporting but an 
increase in the quality of reporting and reporting about strategic initiatives that lead to long-
term sustainability. Nesbitt’s suggestions present an interesting challenge to corporate 
regulators, particularly in relation to the current interpretation of continuous disclosure 
compliance.  
As we look towards recovery from the global financial crisis, a major challenge for 
corporations, institutional investors, financial intermediaries, regulators and individual 
investors alike is how to shift their thinking away from the short-term so that longer-term 
outcomes are the focus of their financial decision-making. In combination, the papers in this 
forum show that short-termism is multi-faceted, and identify the need for a multi-disciplinary 
approach to finding solutions to address short-termist behaviour of the various economic 
players. Finding such solutions is a challenge in itself, creating opportunities for the 
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development of interdisciplinary research programs to further understand the underlying 
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1 Hawley and Williams (2000a) refer to large fiduciary institutions, such as pension fund, mutual funds and bank 
trusts, as “universal owners’.  
2 Hawley and Williams (2007) refer to the financial intermediated society as “fiduciary capitalism”. Similarly, 
the management literature that Gavin Nicholson and Zoie Cook draw on in their paper uses the term 
“institutional capitalism” to describe the concentrated ownership of corporations in the hands of large 
institutional investors.  
3 Governance of universal owners has become more complex due to the multiple agency problems encountered 
in relationships between the expanding numbers of intermediaries (Hawley and Williams, 2007). Multiple 
agency problems have long been identified as limiting the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in the 
context of pension/superannuation funds (see Lakonishok et al. 1992 and Gallery et al., 1996).  
